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ABSTRACT
In 2017, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker declared the re-
industrialization of the European Union (EU) a top priority. The new EU
industrial policy seeks to boost industrial competitiveness and leverage
investments into manufacturing, thereby increasing industry’s share of EU
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 20% by 2020. What may appear to be a
Keynesian industrial policy and thus a move away from the EU’s previous
neoliberal agenda, however, seeks to calibrate a further neoliberal structural
adjustment in a highly authoritarian fashion. Internal devaluation through
devaluing labour, intensifying competition and reducing corporate taxes
takes centre-stage. As an auxiliary to the European Semester, national
productivity boards have been established to monitor wage developments
alongside labour productivity and to suggest policy adjustments when cost
competitiveness lags behind the Eurozone average and that of the main
trading partners. Not only have formal democratic institutions and organized
labour been circumvented in the decision-making process regarding such
boards, they will have little voice in the future, and this an area that hitherto
fell largely within the scope of member states: wage bargaining. Hence, the
new EU industrial policy needs to be discredited, de-legitimized and thus,
politicized. A political counter-project, rooted in an alternative industrial
policy geared towards fostering horizontal and democratic solidarity
economy initiatives which have proliferated since 2008, is discussed in the
article’s closing pages.
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Introduction
With the ascendancy of neoliberalism at the European Union (EU) level since the 1980s, industrial
policy came to be denounced as old-fashioned and ineﬃcient, rescuing only temporarily ‘sunset
industries’ or ‘lame duck’ companies from their inevitable downturn. Today, ten years after the
2008 crisis hit, industrial policy seems to be rising like a phoenix from its ashes. Aware that EU aus-
terity politics in response to the crisis has been anything but successful, and alarmed by the rapid
deindustrialization of EU economies, the European Commission (2014) heralded the ‘European
Industrial Renaissance’ as the next step in EU crisis management. In theory, the new EU industrial
policy will trigger a back-shoring of manufacturing capacity in knowledge-intensive sectors from
China and other emerging markets to Europe. The Commission prophesied an increase of the
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Angela Wigger a.wigger@fm.ru.nl
GLOBALIZATIONS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1502496
manufacturing share of EU GDP from currently 15% to 20% by 2020, provided that competitiveness
reforms would be adopted. The view is that the EU’s future prosperity depends on export-led growth,
which in turn relies on the ability to attract investments into the real production economy, most
notably Foreign Direct Investment to compensate for low domestic investment.
Scholars and politicians have considered the new EU industrial policy a turn away from previous
neoliberal austerity politics (see Pochet, 2016). Indeed, the Council of the European Union (2017)1
aﬃrmed that a holistic industrial policy will be central, and Dijsselbloem (2017), social democrat and
former head of the Eurogroup,2 announced a change in the policy mix of the EU crisis management:
‘moving away from austerity and putting more emphasis on deep reforms.’ Similarly, when his suc-
cessor Mário Centeno, incumbent since January 2018, echoed Dijsselbloem, Gianni Pittella (in
CNBC, 2017), the leader of the Socialists and Democrats grouping in the European Parliament, tri-
umphed: ‘We are ﬁnally overcoming the era of blind and stupid austerity that has left behind even
more poor and divided societies across Europe.’ Against the backdrop of widespread popular fatigue
with ﬁscal austerity and persistently high unemployment since 2009, reforms that counter the
decline of the EU’s industrial base appear much-needed. However, what may seem at ﬁrst glance
to be a Keynesian industrial policy instead promises to intensify the neoliberal structural adjustment
that we have seen hitherto.
What is not immediately visible is that the new EU industrial policy, in addition to various funds
leveraging private investments, has a strong internal devaluation component. Internal devaluation is
a strategy that seeks to substitute for currency devaluations as a way to reduce (export) prices and
increase industrial competitiveness relative to other economies.3 It can entail a mix of structural
changes, such as labour and product market reforms that increase wage and price ﬂexibility (Armin-
geon & Baccaro, 2012, p. 256), or a reduction of trade costs and corporate taxes (Petroulakis, 2017).
The European Commission (2016) declared improving the global ‘price’ and ‘cost’ competitiveness
of EU manufacturers a central goal, and envisaged a three-tier internal devaluation strategy: ﬁrst,
depreciating real wages and inducing further labour market reforms; second, intensifying inter-com-
pany competition to lower prices; and third, lowering the overall level of corporate taxation.
Adopting a historical materialist perspective, the article argues that the suggested internal deva-
luation strategy will devalue labour in turbospeed, putting the burden of adjustment once more on
labour rather than capital. While wage repression, labour market reforms, and intense price compe-
tition directly and indirectly deﬂate the cost of labour, the reduction of corporate taxes also expedites
a further redistribution of wealth from labour to capital. Consequently, the share of ‘working poor’
and precarious workers is likely to increase further, with particularly severe impacts on the youth,
women, and migrants, and low-skilled workers. Moreover, structural asymmetries within the EU
will only worsen, and with it the propensity to invest. In addition to constituting a major assault
on labour, the article shows that the chosen institutional architecture for internal devaluation reveals
highly authoritarian traits, epitomizing what Bruﬀ (2014) termed authoritarian neoliberalism (see
also Oberndorfer, 2014; Sandbeck & Schneider, 2014; Tansel, 2017; Cozzolino, 2018).
Particularly, the recently established national productivity boards, which will function as an
auxiliary to the reforms conducted under the European Semester,4 form the touchstone for the gov-
ernance framework for internal devaluation. In sharp contrast to studies that consider the new EU
industrial policy as ‘horizontal in nature’ and national productivity boards as politically ‘neutral’
(Berglof, 2016; Pochet, 2016; Schout & Schwieter, 2018), the article demonstrates that not only
have national parliaments and the European Parliament been circumvented in the decision-making
process regarding such boards, but formal democratic institutions will also remain structurally dis-
empowered in the future. Set up as ‘politically independent’ institutions, national productivity
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boards have been entrusted with the task of ensuring that member states raise productivity while
containing unit labour costs, and suggesting policies when cost competitiveness lags behind the
euro area average and the main trading partners (Council of the European Union, 2016; European
Council, 2016). The democratically unelected and unaccountable European Commission will super-
vise these boards, formulate common standards for measuring productivity, and make use of ensuing
annual reports in the European Semester. Thereby, EU executive and bureaucratic powers will be
strengthened in the wage-setting process, an area that hitherto has fallen outside of EU competences,
while the role of organized labour is likely to be marginalized, if not completely ruled out.
The article primarily discusses internal devaluation with reference to the labour market and inten-
siﬁed capitalist competition.5 The next section locates the internal devaluation programme within
the new EU industrial policy and outlines why it will only increase structural asymmetries in the
EU. Section two reveals the authoritarian neoliberal character of national productivity boards. As
there is a need to not just explain and critique the ongoing neoliberal reconﬁgurations of the EU
state apparatus, but also to consider how the contradictions immanent to such reconﬁgurations pro-
vide opportunities for groups struggling for a post-neoliberal and a post-capitalist world, section
three discusses what an alternative EU industrial policy could look like, and suggests policies that
support solidarity economy initiatives. The conclusions summarize the article’s main contributions.
The new EU industrial policy: internal devaluation through the backdoor
In its Communication ‘For a European Industrial Renaissance’, the European Commission (2014)
set the target to make ‘the EU a more attractive location for the production of goods and services’,
and to reverse the ongoing deindustrialization in Europe reﬂected in the transfer of manufacturing
capacity to China and other emerging markets. The Commission acknowledged that the pace of
economic recovery since 2008 has been slow, and ascribed this to the absence of investment into
European industries. Indeed, both private and public investment in production has undergone a
downward trend since the 1970s, which has been due to saturated markets, lingering industrial over-
capacity alongside slowly growing aggregate demand, as well as a vast outsourcing and oﬀshoring of
labour-intensive production to low-wage countries. Moreover, the tertialization of European econ-
omies required far less investment, while the ever-expanding ﬁnancial sector absorbed vast shares of
surplus capital not invested in industrial production (Wigger, 2017). The decline of investment has
accelerated further since the turn of the century, and particularly since the imposition of austerity: in
the absence of public investment, private investments have also been withheld (Barbiero & Darvas,
2014). Measured in terms of gross ﬁxed capital formation, investment in the EU decreased from
22.1% of GDP in 2000 to 19.2% in 2013, with only a marginal increase to 19.8% in 2016 (Eurostat,
2017). This compares poorly to China and India, with roughly 45% and 30% respectively (World
Bank, 2018). While the investment downturn also aﬀected services, manufacturing saw most of
the reductions, albeit in an uneven fashion, hitting particularly hard the EU’s South, with shortfalls
ranging here from 25% to 60% (European Commission, 2017a).
The new EU industrial strategy consists of multiple funds and policy measures that seek to lever-
age private investments into manufacturing. The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI),
established in 2015, is probably the most prominent measure. Also referred to as the Juncker
Funds, named after Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the EFSI seeks to co-ﬁnance private
ﬁnancing for risky ‘infrastructure and innovation projects’ that would not otherwise be funded. Simi-
larly, the Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enter-
prises (COSME), established in 2014, seeks to improve SMEs’ access to credit on the basis of EU
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guarantees and counter-guarantees, as well as through using the securitization of debt-ﬁnance port-
folios as leverage: every euro invested in a loan guarantee is expected to release up to 30 euros of
private investment (European Commission, 2018a). In a similar vein, the European Steel Action
Plan, Horizon2020 and even the European Defence Action have been subsumed under the new
EU industrial policy, and the Commission (2017b) announced future speciﬁc action plans for almost
every imaginable industrial sector. Additionally, ﬂanking programmes such as ‘Better Regulation’,
‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme’ (REFIT) or ‘Competitiveness Prooﬁng’ have
been employed for the sake of simplifying or removing existing legislation considered costly for
business, as well as for screening new legislation regarding its impact on the global competitiveness
of EU industries.
While the above-mentioned funds and programmes seek to unlock private investments in one
way or another, the Commission also seeks to boost the ‘cost’ and ‘price’ competitiveness of EUman-
ufacturing industries as a way of attracting investments, ultimately serving the goal of catalyzing
export-led economic growth. According to the Commission (2013), manufacturing, which currently
accounts for 40% of all EU exports, will be the main driver for future innovation, jobs, growth and
wealth. Hence, improving ‘cost’ and ‘price’ competitiveness is considered a prerequisite for allowing
EU manufacturing industries to compete successfully on global markets.
Improving ‘cost’ competitiveness through deﬂating the cost of labour
A central yardstick for assessing and comparing the evolution of ‘cost’ competitiveness is unit labour
costs, a ratio between productivity and total labour compensation indicating whether labour costs
rise in line with productivity gains. The components can vary and range from direct and indirect
labour cost structures (which include wages and employers’ contributions as well as social security
and pension schemes), vis-a-vis units of produced output or hours worked (measured either at com-
pany, industry, regional or national level). The general idea is that reducing unit labour costs will
have positive signalling eﬀects to investors, eventually leading to a re-industrialization process across
Europe, higher net exports and economic growth, with a positive trickle-down eﬀect on employment.
Unit labour costs can be reduced by increasing productivity or by reducing elements of the total
labour costs structure. However, as productivity in the EU has slowed considerably alongside vast
deindustrialization since the 1970s, and as productivity gains in the tertiary sector are diﬃcult to
achieve, supply-side strategies, such as labour market adjustments, including wage suppression or
labour market ﬂexibilization, generally receive all of the emphasis.
Internal devaluation through deﬂating labour has been on the EU agenda for quite some time. The
rigid disciplinary rules and institutions of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) already preﬁg-
ured internal devaluation: exchange rate adjustments to cheapen export prices in a context of low
inﬂation and a single currency were no longer an option, while budgetary straitjackets ruled out
national deﬁcit spending and thereby also interventionist industrial policies. Under this yoke, labour
market adjustments therefore became a prominent strategic goal. When the crisis hit in 2008 and
trade balances worsened, the Commission (2011b, p. 22) advocated internal devaluation as a way
to ‘mimic the expenditure-switching eﬀects of “external” exchange rate devaluation’. Scoreboards
of unit labour costs were subsequently used as headline indicators in the so-called Memoranda of
Understanding between member states and the Troika or the IMF/EU, the 2011 European Semester,
the 2011 Euro Plus Pact or the Six Pack (European Commission, 2018b; see also Erne, 2015).6 Losses
in cost competitiveness and overall low investment levels in so-called deﬁcit countries were linked to
sustained increases of unit labour costs and/or the persistence of restrictive employment protection
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legislation, both of which were, it was argued, detrimental to Europe’s economic prospects (Euro-
pean Commission, 2014, 2017c). The argument generally was that countries such as Greece, Ireland,
Spain and Portugal had real wage increases far beyond what could be justiﬁed on the basis of their
productivity performances. Indeed, since 2000 unit labour costs in the Southern periphery increased
25–30% faster than those of Germany (Stockhammer & Onaran, 2012, p. 198).
Germany’s comparatively low unit labour costs served as a benchmark for a reason: Chancellor
Schröder’s Agenda 2010 reforms of 2003–5 entailed a far-reaching internal devaluation programme,
consisting of reducing job protection, tightening job acceptance regulations for the unemployed
(including so-called 1 euro jobs outside regular labour markets), deregulating temporary work
agencies, dismantling social welfare and reducing social contributions for long-term unemployed,
decentralizing collective bargaining, and cutting corporate taxes (see also Bruﬀ, 2015). As part of
the EU’s crisis management strategy, ‘Modell Deutschland’ seems to have been elevated as the EU
standard (see also Beck & Germann 2018, on Modell Deutschland). In fact, German Chancellor
Merkel (2013) repeatedly emphasized that it was vital to keep driving down labour costs in order
to create a regulatory environment in Europe that is attractive to investors. Merkel articulated
what organized (transnational) industrial interests, such as in the conﬁguration of the so-called
Captains of Industry, assembled in the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), have been
pushing for over the last few decades. It is not a coincidence that Merkel invited the ERT to Berlin
in 2013, together with the-then French President Hollande and Commission President Barroso,
where it was jointly agreed that industrial competitiveness should be at the centre of EU policy-
making (ERT, 2013). More concretely, it was agreed that business-friendly regulations, such as
tax reductions, less labour protection and thus more labour market ﬂexibilization, and lower
wages and severance payments were needed, in addition to further privatizations as well as the facili-
tation of mergers and acquisitions – or what the ERT called ‘market-driven consolidation’ (ERT,
2013). To put industrial competitiveness ‘at the core of each and every European policy’ has more-
over been iterated in joint declarations by nationally organized industrial capital groups, such as the
German BDI, the Italian Conﬁndustria and the French MEDEF (BDI, 2014a, 2014b), as well as a
joint declaration handsigned by 125 CEOs in the European manufacturing industry (see Joint
Declaration of Industry Representatives, 2017). And when the ERT in 2014 issued the ‘EU Industrial
Renaissance: Agenda for Action 2014–2019’, consisting of policy priorities and a set of instructions
for the then newly appointed Commission (see ERT, 2014, p. 1), the Commission (2014) soon after
followed with its eponymic ‘For a European Industrial Renaissance’ Communication.
The industrial competitiveness agenda has also been pushed by organized labour. In 2016, the
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the umbrella organization of national trade unions,
joined forces with BusinessEurope, calling ‘on EU institutions to bring competitive and sustainable
industry back to the core of the EU policy agenda’ (ETUC & BusinessEurope, 2016). Surely, ETUC
does not subscribe to an industrial policy based on devaluing labour, but construals that link the cri-
sis’ root causes to a lack of industrial competitiveness, and that seek solutions in attracting industrial
investments, seem to have an enthralling eﬀect. Against the backdrop of ‘America First’, or the ‘Make
in India’ or ‘Made in China 2025’ strategies (which seek to transform India into the next manufac-
turing destination and China into the leading manufacturing power), both organized labour and the
statist centre-left seem preoccupied with winning the global competitiveness race and thus can be
supportive of schemes that come with the air of a Keynesian industrial strategy, despite their con-
crete implications.
Scoreboards of unit labour costs, alongside other competitiveness performance indexes and
benchmarks of best practices, are disciplinary policy tools that constitute the apex of the neoliberal
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organization of capitalism. As Marx observed in the Grundrisse (1973 [1939], p. 164), under capit-
alism, individuals are ruled by abstractions and the character of these abstractions is ‘a product of
historic relations’. Unit labour costs are such an abstraction. They are what Marx called a crude
reductionist travesty that dehumanizes and objectiﬁes commodiﬁed labour. As a calculus for com-
petitive comparisons, EU member states will have to undercut each other’s unit labour costs in a
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ fashion. This is likely to exacerbate existing structural asymmetries in the
EU (see also ETUI, 2016). To begin with, internal devaluation in Germany has been anything but
a success story. While three-quarters of the German GDP has indeed been driven by net exports
since 2000, job growth was mostly due to the expansion of precarious and part-time employment
(Sandbu, 2016, pp. 27–28). Rather than investing in Germany, manufacturers relocated production
to cheap labour areas in Central and Eastern Europe from where they imported components and
processed material more cheaply.
As EU economies mainly trade with each other, albeit in a highly uneven manner, Germany’s
export competitiveness led to a contraction of manufacturing industry in other EU member states.
German surplus capital, or what has not been paid out in wages, moreover has been valorized
through credit extension to the EU’s periphery, where it spurred the growth of ﬁscal deﬁcits and/
or household debt, while debt-fuelled consumption further augmented the trade surplus of the
EU’s North vis-a-vis the South. Therefore, as long as the bulk of trade is intra-EU and extra-EU
exports account for a relatively small share of EU GDP (ranging between 12–15%; see Eurostat,
2017), EU economies cannot all expand their industries and pursue an export-led growth pattern
with large trade surpluses. In the absence of strong global demand, internal devaluation will have
only a moderate eﬀect on the EU’s net-export position (Stockhammer & Onaran, 2012, pp. 195–
196). Thus, reducing unit labour costs in one member state will weaken unit labour costs in others,
and wage repression, combined with austerity, will undermine domestic and also intra-EU consump-
tion, as well as trigger deﬂation – all factors that render the success of the proclaimed investment-
cum-export-led growth strategy highly unrealistic.
Improving ‘price’ competitiveness through intensiﬁed competition
In addition to boosting the ‘cost’ competitiveness of European industries by targeting unit labour
costs and reducing so-called ‘rigidities of the labour market’, the Commission has been determined
to improve ‘price’ competitiveness by reducing ‘rigidities in product markets’ (European Commis-
sion, 2015a, p. 57). A strict enforcement of EU competition policy has been advocated as the main
lever to reduce the costs of capital, energy, electricity, raw materials and other variable production
inputs. According to the Commission (2017a), ‘competition policy is an important driver for
ﬁrms to innovate and invest’, and to ensure ‘that ﬁrms can source their inputs at optimum conditions
and beneﬁt from competitive outlets for their products’. Intense price competition is moreover
believed to lead to higher productivity (European Commission, 2017a). Flanking ‘pro-competition’
reforms have already been adopted, such as the above-mentioned REFIT or ‘Competitiveness
Prooﬁng’, in addition to reforms targeting barriers that inhibit cross-border corporate expansion
and investments in product and service markets (European Commission, 2017a).
Competition policy has functioned as an industrial policy at the outset. Although the Treaty of
Rome of 1957 did not mention industrial policy by the word, the preambles declared ‘a high degree
of competitiveness’ a Community goal (see Article 2). In the postwar decades of European inte-
gration, the enforcement of supranational competition rules had a strong neo-mercantilist and pro-
tectionist outlook (Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2014). Distortions to (supranational) competition rules
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were commonplace, and the Commission generously permitted direct or indirect state aid such as
friendly loans, ﬁnancial support for investments or R&D projects, as well as tax reductions or
guaranteed procurement. Over time, the Commission became more activist, and sought to create
European champions rather than allow national governments to pick their winners. It facilitated
all sorts of cross-border industry collaboration and economic consolidation through mergers and
acquisitions (Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2014, p. 67). Primacy was given to bolstering European indus-
tries that were lagging behind the much larger and technologically more advanced American
counterparts in high-value added sectors, such as computing and aerospace, and to protecting indus-
trial sectors considered ‘too important to fail’, such as steel, coal, electricity, railways, textiles, ship-
building, infrastructure or defence industries (Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2014, p. 69). During the
stagﬂation crisis of the 1970s, the Commission even tolerated crisis cartels setting prices and limiting
outputs (Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2014, p. 69).
Although with the neoliberal turn in the 1980s industrial policy was denounced as part of what
Giersch (1985) diagnosed as ‘Eurosclerosis’, the rhetoric of competitiveness stayed. Rather than
curbing competition to improve the competitiveness of European industries, intense competition
was propagated to enhance competitiveness. The neoliberal logic entailed that if a plethora of dis-
crete companies strive to become more eﬃcient, increase their productivity and stay ahead of rivals
through lower prices, higher levels of competitiveness of entire economies can be expected. In this
vein, state aid was curtailed, cartels stringently prosecuted and public utility sectors privatized. More-
over, the notion ‘fair competition’ was replaced with ‘free competition’ in the consolidation of the
treaty texts through the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The logic of competition leading to competitiveness
was also entrenched in the Lisbon Agenda of 2000 and its successor strategy Europe 2020. It is there-
fore not surprising that former Competition Commissioner Almunia (2014) announced that the new
EU industrial policy would diﬀer markedly from that of the 1970s. According to Almunia, strict
enforcement of EU competition rules was ‘the cheapest and most eﬀective structural reform’, ‘at
no extra cost for the taxpayer’ (Almunia, 2012a, 2012b). By intensifying competition as a way to
lower price levels, EU economies, so the idea goes, can compete themselves out of the crisis.
Lower prices may appear much-needed in times of economic recession, and a strict enforcement
of competition rules may seem less painful than ﬁscal austerity, onslaughts on social rights and the
repression of wages. However, competition facilitated by strict rules enforcement can intensify to an
extent that prices of competitors can only be undercut by a further exploitation of labour (Wigger,
2017). While it makes sense from an individual capitalist perspective to maximize the freedom to
exploit labour, this is not the case on an aggregate level. If less surplus from the production sphere
is redistributed to wage earners, and by extension to society at large, the macro-eﬀect will be reduced
aggregate demand. The competitive lowering of prices moreover tempers future proﬁt expectations,
and thereby the propensity to invest in new production capacities. The coercive nature of capitalist
competition can therefore precipitate what Harvey (2010, p. 29) called a peculiar combination of low
proﬁts, low wages, and low investments. Hence, by increasing privatized control over surplus capital,
the new EU industrial policy is unlikely to channel investments to the real production sphere but
rather to free even more liquid capital for speculative activities in the ﬁnancial sphere.
The authoritarian neoliberal traits of internal devaluation
The governance framework for the internal devaluation component within the new EU industrial
policy is yet another domain where neoliberal solutions are imposed in a highly authoritarian
fashion. In 2009, the Commission appointed a ‘high level group of experts’ to develop a long-
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term common industrial strategy, and thus from the outset sought to avoid a broad-based debate
with various societal stakeholders. The resulting policy suggestions informed the Commission’s
Communication ‘Industrial Policy Reinforcing Competitiveness’ of 2011, calling for deep structural
reforms and coherent and coordinated policies, including policies that target unit labour costs (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011a). In 2012, the Four Presidents’ Report7 took up the competitiveness
agenda, suggesting that EU governments should conclude annual contractual arrangements with
the Commission, targeting areas where competitiveness was weak. In 2013, at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Chancellor Merkel advocated ‘Competitiveness Pacts’, which similar
to the Fiscal Compact should create the prerequisite to get access to ﬁnancial aid under what euphe-
mistically had been termed the ‘solidarity mechanism’.
Only one month later, the Commission (2013) launched a proposal for a ‘Convergence and Com-
petitiveness Instrument’, which suggested a procedure according to which the Commission would
make recommendations to individual member governments on how to regain competitiveness.
Almost simultaneously, the European Council (2013, pp. 17–20) committed itself to negotiate ‘Part-
nerships for Growth, Employment and Competitiveness’, which entailed that individual govern-
ments and the Commission would conclude bilateral reform contracts that were subject to
approval by the Council, notably in the conﬁguration of its Competitiveness Council. In contrast
to the reform requirements spelled out in the Memoranda of Understanding, the bilateral competi-
tiveness treaties would not only demand reform eﬀorts from the most crisis-hit but from all Euro-
zone members. Moreover, in contrast to the Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations issued ex ante by
the Commission under the European Semester, the competitiveness treaties would be legally binding,
and thus be enforceable through ex post litigation before EU Courts. The view was that the 2011 Euro
Plus Pact and the European Semester failed to deliver the expected results – not because of the sub-
stance of the policies but due to their non-binding nature.
In a political climate of growing Euroscepticism and outright anti-EU sentiments, the subsequent
Five Presidents’ Report8 in 2015 no longer mentioned the involvement of the courts but proposed
establishing national competitiveness authorities, entrusted with the supervision of policies and
the analysis of performances in the ﬁeld of competitiveness. These authorities were to be functionally
autonomous and politically independent from ministries and public authorities, and enjoy a statu-
tory basis in national law, while their decisions should have the authority of law (Five Presidents’
Report, 2015). Establishing national competitiveness authorities, rather than competitiveness
pacts, had to create a strong sense of ‘national ownership’ of the ‘necessary policies and reforms’,
while leaving suﬃcient room for national disparities and legal traditions.
According to the Five President’s Report, ‘Member States have a responsibility and self-interest to
maintain sound policies and to embark on reforms that make their economies more ﬂexible and
competitive’ (Five Presidents’ Report, 2015, p. 4). What may appear to be a decentralized approach
actually involved a high degree of centralization: the Commission would supervise the national
competitiveness authorities, formulate common templates and standards, and then use the reported
progress as a basis for the ‘country-speciﬁc recommendations’ in the European Semester (Five
Presidents’ Report, 2015, pp. 7–8). Common standards had to span the ﬁeld of ‘labour markets, com-
petitiveness, business environment and public administrations, as well as certain aspects of tax policy
(e.g. corporate tax base)’ (Five Presidents’ Report, 2015, p. 9). Importantly, national competitiveness
authorities had to ‘assess whether wages are evolving in line with productivity’ and in comparison
with other Eurozone members and ‘the main comparable trading partners’ (Five Presidents’ Report,
2015, p. 7). EU economies thus had to undercut each other’s cost and price competitiveness plus
those of their main non-EU trading partners. Furthermore, national competitiveness authorities
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had to promote the ‘ﬂexicurity’ concept, the contradictory combination of ‘ﬂexible labour contracts’
coupled with ‘lifelong learning strategies’ and ‘modern social security systems’ (Five Presidents’
Report, 2015, p. 9).
When these proposals still caused reservations to be expressed, the Commission subsequently
changed the name, and national competitiveness ‘authorities’ were downgraded to national compe-
titiveness ‘boards’. In October 2015, it issued a ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on
the Establishment of National Competitiveness Boards’ (European Commission, 2015b). The Ecoﬁn
Council9 revised the Commission’s Recommendation in June 2016, and shortly after, in September,
the European Council endorsed these changes and issued a recommendation, calling upon Eurozone
members to establish national productivity boards within 18 months (European Council, 2016). In
addition to dropping the word competitiveness and replacing it with productivity, there were minor
revisions, such as degrading the Commission’s supervisory role from a ‘coordinator’ to a ‘facilitator’
of the exchange of views and best practices among national productivity boards. The overall sub-
stance of the mandate entrusted upon national productivity boards, however, remained unchanged:
the ‘boards should analyse productivity and competitiveness developments’ not only among Euro-
zone members but also ‘relative to global competitors’, and ‘address cost and non-cost factors that
can aﬀect prices’ (Council of the European Union, 2016; European Council, 2016).
National productivity boards should moreover be ‘in charge of the design and implementation of
policies in the ﬁeld of productivity and competitiveness in the Member State or at European level’
(Council of the European Union, 2016), and be able to react to national developments and initiatives
proposed by national authorities, reinforce the policy dialogue at the national level and have an
impact on national debates. National productivity boards may sound more trivial than the initially
suggested competitiveness pacts or national competitiveness authorities. However, reporting on unit
labour costs developments, and suggesting policy reforms that seek to raise productivity while
containing unit labour costs and making adjustments when cost competitiveness lags behind the
Eurozone average or the main trading partners, remain core activities. In addition, the annual
reports will inform the Commission’s country-speciﬁc recommendations in the European Semester
and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure processes (Council of the European Union, 2016;
European Commission, 2016). This has also been emphasized in the Communication ‘A renewed
EU Industrial Policy Strategy’, where the Commission (2017a) announced that it intended ‘to
work with member states in the European Semester to deliver on the main needs for industrial
competitiveness’.
The strengthening of the European Semester through national productivity boards surveilling and
attempting to enforce internal devaluation is yet another instance of authoritarian neoliberalism at
the EU level, which seeks to insulate certain policies and institutional practices from social and pol-
itical dissent (cf. Bruﬀ, 2014, p. 115). To begin with, the European Commission deliberately side-
stepped the ordinary legislative procedure and thereby the involvement of the European
Parliament when recommending that the Council should recommend such boards at national
level, ruling out any parliamentary oversight and debate over the role and function of national pro-
ductivity boards (European Parliament, 2015). Furthermore, the neoliberal adjustment agenda will
in the future, at least by intention, be hermetically sealed from institutionalized channels for con-
testation and democratic accountability (see also Cozzolino, 2018; Tansel, 2018). Indeed, one can
be easily deceived when reading that these boards should be ‘unbiased’ and their expert analyses
‘formulated in the general interest’ instead of containing ‘only or mainly views of speciﬁc groups
of stakeholders’ (Council of the European Union, 2016). However, by enjoying ‘functional auton-
omy’ and political independence vis-à-vis any public authority, these boards are designed as a
GLOBALIZATIONS 9
one-way street when informing ‘the national debate in the ﬁeld of productivity and competitiveness’.
As Dijsselbloem (2016) tweeted, these boards ‘should primarily objectify the national debate’.
Not only formal democratic bodies like the European Parliament and national parliaments but
also organized labour has been, and will also in the future be, sidestepped. Although in response
to criticism, the 2016 Council Recommendation included a notion that productivity boards should
‘respect the national practice and institutions for wage formation’, the Commission had already
advocated that ‘social partners’ should use the annual reports as guidance during wage-setting nego-
tiations, and ought to take into account productivity developments in order to avoid ‘misalignments
between wages, productivity and skills’, or what is also referred to as wage formation rigidities (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017c). Whereas the Commission already had a foot in the door regarding the
wage formation process and labour cost adjustments on the basis of the European Semester, the
Euro Plus Pact or the Six Pack (see Erne, 2015), the competitiveness governance framework now
seeks to put an end to tripartite social dialogue at the national level. Arguably, none of the EU aus-
terity or the hasty bailout packages has been implemented in cooperation with organized labour, but
the Commission, by proxy of national productivity boards, can now fully intrude on a policy domain
that used to be a national preserve. Ironically, national trade unions and the ETUC have long pushed
for wage coordination at EU level; however, certainly not in the way it is materializing now. As a
representative of ETUC (2015) remarked: ‘we are only a hair’s breath away from setting maximum
wage standards for collective bargaining that are legally binding, or from questioning the validity of
strike action’.
The fact that there have been only minor changes since the ﬁrst proposal is indicative of yet
another feature of authoritarian neoliberalism, namely that fewer attempts are being made to
achieve consent from contesting groups through policy and/or material concessions. Against
the backdrop of growing dissent, protest and resistance to neoliberal EU integration from (rad-
ical) left movements and organizations, and the recent landslide electoral victories of neo-populist
Eurosceptic, radical right and even neo-fascist parties, the neoliberal agenda can only be pursued
through a pre-emptive administrative, legal and coercive apparatus sealed oﬀ from popular con-
testation (cf. Bruﬀ, 2014, p. 116). Thus, despite heightened contestation EU institutions continue
to follow a neoliberal course, thereby relying on various complex, multi-layered and cross-cutting
EU economic governance packages, and newly erected bodies with seemingly harmless names,
such as the national productivity boards. The sheer complexity of this authoritarian surge is
paired with an active marginalization and increasingly also the criminalization of oppositional
forces (Tansel, 2017, p. 2).
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that this is all indicative of the deep political crisis in
which the EU ﬁnds itself. As Poulantzas (1978, p. 241) aptly put it: ‘[a]uthoritarian statism
does not correspond to a univocal strengthening of the State: it rather involves the dual aspect
of strengthening-weakening’. He observed that weakening with regard to, for instance, shortfalls
in legitimacy and ongoing states of crisis oﬀers ‘fresh possibilities to the Left’ and creates ‘new
forms of popular struggle’ (Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 245–246). Democratizing the EU and its insti-
tutions to remedy the vast legitimacy shortfall may seem out of reach, if not entirely impossible;
yet, there are also indicators of a political counter-project that directly or indirectly discredits,
delegitimizes and politicizes the authoritarian reconﬁguration of EU institutions and the impo-
sition of neoliberal race-to-the-bottom structural adjustment policies and procedures. The new
forms of popular struggles that Poulantzas (1978, p. 246) observed in the late 1970s exhibited
‘a characteristic anti-statism and express themselves in the mushrooming of self-management
centres and networks of direct intervention by the masses in the decisions which aﬀect them’.
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As will be discussed below, these struggles have indeed surfaced again in the last decade, against
the backdrop of protracted and multiple crises.
Discussion: an alternative EU industrial policy fostering solidarity economy
initiatives
A range of scholars and organizations have suggested an alternative, employment-friendly, ecologi-
cally sustainable, transparent and democratically accountable EU industrial policy that ensures social
participation and tackles the vast structural asymmetries across the EU (see Rosa Luxemburg Stif-
tung, 2017). Putting labour at the core is certainly the way to go; however, most of these suggestions
remain implicitly or explicitly within the capitalist social relations of (re)production. Arguably, ﬁxed
blueprints for a post-neoliberal and post-capitalist society are neither possible nor desirable, if demo-
cratic processes are to be taken seriously, but we should not refrain from discussing at least the con-
tours of such alternatives. From a historical materialist vantage point, changing the social relations of
(re)production should constitute the bedrock for a systemic change, while competition on prices and
wages need to be ruled out (Wigger, 2018). There is nothing wrong with producing higher quality
and more innovative products in a competitive spirit; yet production should be reoriented towards
what Marx (1965 [1887]) called ‘use value’, rather than ‘exchange-value’ relying on labour as a com-
parative advantage. Competition originates from the Latin word competere, which refers to striving
and running together and learning from each other. Giving signiﬁcance to the original sense of the
word could be a step in the right direction. Ideally, democratic or consensual decision-making should
take centre-stage. However, as there is and cannot be a ‘one size ﬁts all’ solution, free experimen-
tation of diﬀerent formats, evolving from bottom-up grassroots initiatives, should prevail, leading
to a coexistence of multiple laboratories for the production, distribution and consumption of
goods and services, as well as the reproduction of the wider ‘social factory’ beyond the workplace
(see Cleaver, 2000 in Bieler & Jordan, 2017).
Real existing ‘solidarity economy’ initiatives in many ways preﬁgure more equitable, horizon-
tally- and democratically-managed social relations of (re)production. Over the last decade,
workers’ collectives, cooperatives, mutuals, associations or foundations have proliferated, particu-
larly in the most crisis-hit EU member states (Wigger, 2018). Estimates suggest that there are
currently more than 250,000 grassroots cooperatives in the EU, which are owned by 163 million
citizens (equivalent of one-third of the EU population), and which employ 5.4 million people
(Cooperatives Europe, 2018). Although solidarity economy initiatives can be more or less radical
in resisting prevailing capitalist logics, overall they can be seen as a coagulation of structures of
resistance against authoritarian neoliberalism in contemporary capitalism (Wigger, 2018). Solidar-
ity economy initiatives frequently include communal ownership and horizontal direct-democratic
decision-making structures, with fewer supervisory and management layers and a higher degree
of social inclusion in terms of gender, age and (dis)ability, as well as migrants (Wigger, 2018).
They tend to give primacy to equity, reciprocity, cooperation, mutual aid, solidarity and environ-
mental sustainability – all antidotes to cut-throat capitalist competition and the maximization of
proﬁts (Kokkinidis, 2015a, 2015b).
Importantly, solidarity economy initiatives come with a high transformative potential. Rather
than operating in isolation, they often form part of dense network structures that cluster comp-
lementary products and services, and create new synergies among local, regional, national and
also international peer-to-peer producer and consumer networks. As a result, they often rely on
shorter supply chains, rendering the production and consumption of goods and services less
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alienated, while also reducing energy-wasteful transportation (Wigger, 2018). The transformative
potential also lies in the fact that solidarity economy initiatives oﬀer an infrastructure of dissent,
making new political imaginaries possible (Vogiatzoglou, 2015). Solidarity, after all, is a relation
forged through political struggle, which reshapes ‘the terrain of what is politically possible and
what counts and what is recognized as political’ (Featherstone, 2012, p. 7).
The recent surge of solidarity economy initiatives is closely linked to the disruptive mass protests
against the neoliberal EU crisis management, where hundreds of thousands took to the streets, occu-
pied central squares, held popular assemblies or engaged in strikes or acts of civil disobedience, lead-
ing to the emergence of new social movements, like the 15-M in Spain or the Syntagma Square
movement in Greece, as well as a myriad of new political parties or party-like platforms (Wigger,
2018). In particular, the square occupations and neighbourhood assemblies that started after the
mass demonstrations in Spain provided an arena for solidarity economy networks to engage with
a more heterogeneous audience, bringing together diﬀerent activist groups and previously non-poli-
ticized individuals (Wigger, 2018, p. 44). These initiatives have oﬀered a more concrete, praxis-
oriented form of resistance compared to the often short-lived and fragmented protest actions in
the streets, and have attracted the political support from a disparate set of progressive social forces.
One of the most radical examples, which emerged as an activist response to the crisis and the
unbridled power of the ﬁnancial sector in contemporary capitalism, is the Cooperativa Integral Cat-
alana (CIC), the Integrated Cooperative. The CIC seeks to synthesize all activities of social life under
an umbrella framework of mutual help that transcends capitalist forms of organization and pro-
duction (see CIC, 2018). Established in 2010 in Catalonia with the aim of promoting degrowth
ideas, self-management, direct democracy and the empowerment of local nodes by cutting out inter-
mediaries between production and consumption, the CIC has grown into a network involving sev-
eral thousand people and has progressively moved into new activities, subsuming a network of ever
more cooperatives (Dafermos, 2017). The CICmodel has been copied, with sister networks emerging
all over Europe (CIC, 2018). For example, similar initiatives can be found in Greece, such as Syn.al-
l.ois, a Cooperative for Alternative and Solidarity Trade that was established in 2011 (see Kokkinidis,
2015a, 2015b).
While the CIC seeks to establish autonomous alternatives and deliberately operates beyond the
remit of the state and the capitalist market, other solidarity economy initiatives are ﬁghting for
legal recognition at national and EU levels, demanding for example more lenient tax treatment
and exemptions from national and EU competition rules (CIRIEC International, 2016; Cooperatives
Europe, 2018). While the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2011 that a speciﬁc tax treatment
can indeed be justiﬁed based on their diﬀerent nature compared to for-proﬁt-enterprises, the ECJ
also interpreted associations or federations among solidarity economy initiatives as illicit and
anti-competitive agreements (CIRIEC International, 2016, p. 39). Similarly, the European Commis-
sion has hitherto paid no attention to the speciﬁc needs of the solidarity economy, and holds on to its
neoliberal mantra that capitalist competition should receive primacy at all times. In a Communi-
cation on cooperative societies, the Commission (2004, p. 13) argued that despite their distinctive
features, cooperatives ‘do not need preferential treatment’, have ‘to compete eﬀectively in their mar-
kets and on equal terms with other forms of enterprise’ and ‘are therefore subject to competition
rules’. Concretely, this means that there are no exemptions regarding state aid or cooperative agree-
ments between diﬀerent solidarity initiatives. This illustrates that the Commission employs EU com-
petition rules as a ﬁctitious equalizer, which standardizes corporations irrespective of their size,
purpose and economic power into something they are not, namely equal market players.
Cooperation and mutual aid, the antitheses of capitalist competition, are thereby marginalized or
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ruled out entirely as organizing principles. This is to the detriment of solidarity economy initiatives,
which can only thrive and exploit their transformative potential with the capacity to cooperate and
form associations and federations.
Ironically, the Commission’s (2017d, p. 6) recent ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe’ starts
with a reference to the Manifesto di Ventotene (‘For a Free and United Europe’), written by Altiero
Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, who were imprisoned by the fascist regime on the isle of Venetone during
the Second World War and whose federalist ideas formed part of the very impetus for kickstarting
European integration. Not only was Spinelli a communist, and Rossi the founder of a cooperative,
but in the Manifesto they also suggested an ‘industrial reform which will extend workers’ ownership
in non-nationalized sectors, through co-operative adventures, employee proﬁt-sharing, and so on’
(quoted in Mayo, 2018). The current EU economic policies, including industrial and competition
policy, are a far cry from the ‘free and united Europe’ as envisaged by the Italian anti-fascists. Against
the backdrop of increasingly authoritarian traits in which the neoliberal course is solidiﬁed in so-
called independent and democratically non-accountable bodies, the Commission’s (2017d, p. 6)
invocation for Europe’s future that the hard-earned human dignity, freedom and democracy in
Europe can never be relinquished seems merely a platitude.
Conclusion
Ten years after the global economic crisis, various EU institutions and politicians have come to rea-
lize that low inﬂation, low public debt-GDP ratios and tight budget deﬁcits have not led to the prom-
ised economic convergence, let alone to a sustained and balanced economic recovery. It has also been
acknowledged that reforms are needed to tackle the vast structural asymmetries that have opened up
a North–South and West–East divide. Likewise, it has been recognized that ﬁnancial markets have
grown out of proportion vis-à-vis the production economy, and that measures are needed to channel
ﬁnancial excess capital into European industries. In this vein, the new EU industrial policy is meant
to serve as one big lever to attract private investments.
This article has revealed that the new EU industrial policy, in addition to various funds and regu-
latory packages, endorses the very same neoliberal internal devaluation measures that have under-
pinned the EMU since Maastricht, and that were also included into the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure of the European Semester in 2010. The chosen way forward is as follows: to
compensate for the loss of exchange rate ﬂexibility within the Eurozone as a way of cheapening
EU exports, all emphasis is given to improving the cost and price competitiveness of European
industries — mostly through wage adjustments and further labour market ﬂexibilization — as
well as lower prices following from unbridled competition, alongside a lowering of corporate tax
rates. As has been shown in this article, in addition to directly and indirectly depreciating the
costs of labour, internal devaluation also comes with an authoritarian reconﬁguration of the EU
state apparatus. With the establishment of allegedly ‘independent’ national productivity boards,
keeping track of wage vis-à-vis productivity developments, and suggesting national reforms in sec-
tors and areas deemed to lack competitiveness, the unelected and unaccountable European Commis-
sion ﬁnds itself once more in a fortiﬁed position when ‘commanding’ structural adjustments through
the European Semester. Against the backdrop of growing popular contestation of the European inte-
gration project, it remains to be seen whether and how national productivity boards, as vassals of the
European Commission’s new industrial policy, will indeed manage to foster internal devaluation.
The solidarity economy initiatives, as discussed in the last section, may appear marginalized and
disparate struggles, but they are also indicative of concrete utopias that already exist and thus provide
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the foundations for an alternative EU industrial policy. They are a crucial part of ongoing attempts to
discredit, de-legitimize and politicize authoritarian neoliberal crisis management strategies at
national and EU levels and capitalism in Europe more generally.
Notes
1. The Council of the European Union, or the Council of Ministers, is an EU body where national ministers
meet in policy-speciﬁc areas to adopt legislative acts and coordinate policies, mostly together with the
European Parliament through the so-called ordinary legislative procedure or what used to be termed
codecision. The Council should not be mistaken for the European Council, consisting of the heads of
state of the member state governments, the European Council President, and the President of the Euro-
pean Commission, which deﬁnes the general course and priorities of European integration.
2. The Eurogroup is an informal and democratically unaccountable body without a statutory basis in the
Treaties, consisting of the ﬁnance ministers of the Eurozone members, the Commissioner for economic
and ﬁnancial aﬀairs, and the president of the European Central Bank. The Eurogroup enjoys vast dis-
cretionary powers and coordinates economic policies among Eurozone members.
3. As unilateral currency devaluations by individual member states have become impossible with the estab-
lishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and euro as the common currency, internal
devaluation strategies oﬀer an ‘alternative’ option to cheapen exports.
4. The European Semester was introduced in 2010 and forms part of the annual supranational economic
policy coordination process, which allows the European Commission to surveil economic and ﬁscal pol-
icies, including budget plans, as well as macroeconomic and structural reforms, and issue country-
speciﬁc recommendations for the next 12 to 18 months.
5. At the time of writing (March 2018), the broader EU package of corporate tax reforms is in the process of
being launched and thus falls outside the scope of the article. Nevertheless, its direction of travel is clearly
towards the overall goals mentioned already, i.e. lower levels of taxation.
6. Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) are bilateral contracts specifying the reform conditions for mem-
ber states that requested ﬁnancial assistance. The Europlus Pact, signed in 2011, seeks to strengthen
economic policy coordination among Eurozone and other member states with the aim to improve ‘econ-
omic competitiveness’. The Six Pack, also adopted in 2011, consists of ﬁve regulations and one directive
that seek to strengthen the Commission’s budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance powers under the
new macroeconomic imbalance procedure – a procedure installed to detect risky economic
developments.
7. The Four Presidents’ Report is a joint report by the presidents of respectively the European Council, the
European Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank.
8. In comparison to the Four Presidents’ Report of 2012, the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015 also included
the President of the European Parliament.
9. ECOFIN is short for the Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Council.
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